The dominant explanation proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling purposes (addressing recognition concerns; increasing strategic autonomy, and pleasing the EU). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to assess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern European countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their approaches toward multilateralism.
explanation refers to new democracies' use of international law as a "lock-in" instrument (Moravcsik 2000) . The argument suggests that governments join multilateral institutions in order to cement domestic reforms and policies. But no explanation is offered for the variation among newly democratized states in terms of their engagement with the multilateral system. This article tackles this puzzle and offers a novel explanation for why newly democratized states in Europe are among the top ratifiers of post-Cold War multilateral treaties. We suggest that these states use treaties not as an internal lock-in signal, but as an external signal communicating specific foreign policy objectives. These signals are intended to strengthen their international reputation, to increase strategic autonomy, and to please the European Union (EU) as the key sponsor of multilateralism.
The Conventional Argument: New Democracies, Credibility and Lock In
An important body of literature addresses the role of new democracies in international relations and in international law, and shows that newly democratized states are more likely to join international organizations and ratify international treaties than are other states. One important reason for the active use of international law is related to the governments' need to address concerns of (domestic) credibility. New democracies need to deal with time inconsistency (the fact that government's incentives change over time) and the problem of incomplete or asymmetric information (see Barro and Gordon 1983; Canzoneri 1985; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rodrik 1989) . Especially in transitional countries with new authorities in office, a short political life expectancy, and a legacy of governmental incentives to renege on promises, the public may lack information and therefore be generally skeptical about the new government's motives. In order to mitigate this internal credibility problem, the government of a newly established democracy must send a serious signal of true intentions. Consequently, newly democratized states rely more than other states on international institutions as a communication device vis-à-vis internal constituencies, in order to build up their credibility.
The dominant version of the communication device has been termed "lock in." In the face of political uncertainty, governments lock in favored policies within intergovernmental democratic networks buffering against future governments' incentives to undo domestic reforms (Moravcsik 2000:226, 228; Pinto 1993:43) . There exist different versions of the lockin argument. One strand emphasizes the goal of "locking in" democratization to minimize the risk of democratic reversal. It reflects the governmental efforts to consolidate democracy in order to protect it against non-democratic opponents. Another strand explains the participation of transitional states in regional institutions such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a means of bolstering security-related or economic reforms at home. Lock in describes an attempt to pre-empt domestically induced weakening of reforms that are important for stabilization, economic reform or building reputation (Goldstein 1998:143-44; Pevehouse 2002a Pevehouse , 2002b Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006) .
Notwithstanding different objectives, "locking in" is mainly understood as an internal signal to political opponents and the domestic public. It has been prominently applied in various issue areas. Moravcsik for instance, examining the European Court of Human Rights, argues that governments of newly established democracies join the regime as a tactical move "to consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-à-vis non-democratic political threats" (2000:220; see also Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006) . In the case of new EU democracies, the lock-in instrument manifests itself mainly through joining regional regimes such as the EU and NATO (Pevehouse 2002b; Schimmelfennig 2005 ). The lock-in argument is also well-known in relation to trade agreements. Using stock market data from Mexico, Tomz (1997) provides strong evidence that NAFTA made trade reforms more credible. He shows that agreements can exert a powerful effect on the trustworthiness of reforms. In sum, the existing empirical evidence indicates that the lock-in mechanism is particularly important in the context of regional institutions.
We posit that locking in is less relevant in the context of multilateral agreements. We conjecture that if new democracies find themselves confronted with a prominent regional institution (like the EU or NATO), this will provide the prime institutional framework for their lock-in intentions. By implication, these states will commit to multilateral treaties for other reasons.
Our Argument: Multilateral Treaties and External Signals
We argue that multilateral treaties are important external signals. We understand them as alternative tools of communication to the inward-oriented lock-in mechanism. They serve goals other than democratic consolidation or economic reforms, and are not directed at the domestic public or domestic opponents, but address a different audience. External signals are outward-oriented and are sent by governments to the international community or international and regional organizations to communicate their foreign policy objectives in international politics. Put differently, states use external and internal signals to pursue different objectives and to target different audiences. We distinguish three types of external signals in the context of new European democracies. Table 1 summarizes the three signals and lists the action, objective and the receiver. The first RECOGNITION signal reflects the objective of newly democratized European states to achieve acceptance by the international community. Whereas many new democracies in other parts of the world were prominently active in bilateral, regional or international treaty-making prior to regime transition, new democracies in Europe (under the influence of the Soviet Union) were heavily constrained as independent actors in world politics. The 1990s
provided them with a new opportunity to remedy this deficiency by actively participating in treaty-making as well as through ratifying a set of treaties that were previously negotiated by other states. Therefore, participation is explained by new EU democracies' desire for international acceptance and recognition. Commitment to international agreements enhances recognition and increases the perceived legitimacy of a state (Franck 1990; Hurd 1999) .
Recognition is a constituting factor of state sovereignty. "Recognition is an institution of State practice that can resolve uncertainties as to status and allow for new situations to be regularized" (Crawford 2007:27) . In this sense, foreign policy tools are used to signal new sovereignty as a state. There are various tools available, including legal practice (customary international law) or credible implementation. For latecomers, the process of establishing customs and credible commitment through implementation is, however, too lengthy.
Therefore, consent to existing international treaties offers a "short cut" to international recognition.
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Following this logic, the act of ratifying multilateral treaties is the search for a seal of approval by the international community. In testing our argument, we also pay attention to the fact that new democracies might join multilateral treaties for other reasons than those outlined above. They might want to reap short-term benefits (for example, transfer payments or technical assistance) or to express a genuine and sincere commitment toward multilateralism.
Empirical Analysis
We For the purpose of this analysis, we use event history techniques. Event history modeling offers an appropriate method for analyzing the timing of political change, i.e., the change in status from non-ratification to ratification. It not only considers which states ratify treaties, but also takes into account that states do so with different time lags. Furthermore, event history techniques can be applied to data with "multiple events per subject" (Therneau and Grambsch 2000) . In this study, each subject under observation can experience multiple and parallel events. Since our goal is to demonstrate the overall pattern of multilateral treaty commitment -rather than to examine the ratification of individual treaties per se -we need to take into account that each state can ratify up to 76 treaties. The state is the "subject" of the analysis and is at risk of experiencing the "event" of ratifying a treaty. That is, a particular state can ratify several treaties, and it can ratify any number of these treaties in the same year.
In order to account for this specification, we organized the data as a counting process following the approach of Andersen and Gill (1982) (AG). The AG approach is particularly suited to analyzing mutual independence of the observations within a subject (BoxSteffensmeier and Zorn 2002:1073-74; Therneau and Grambsch 2000:185-86) . It assumes that multiple events for any particular subject are conditionally independent; the risk of experiencing the event for a given subject is unaffected by any earlier event that happened to the same subject. Put differently, state A can ratify treaty X without or before ratifying treaty Y, and state B can ratify treaty Y without or before ratifying treaty X. The counting process data consists of multiple records and is set up as annual intervals. and influential than weak states in negotiating and designing treaties, they can shape the content of treaties to make them congruent with their own interests. Therefore, powerful states find that treaty ratification entails obligations with little or no constraining effect (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996) .
Second, we control for the extent to which a state is economically interconnected with the global economy using the variable TRADE OPENNESS (total trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)) (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009) . Countries that are more interdependent with the global economic system generally will be more supportive of strengthening multilateral regulatory governance than countries with limited economic ties.
We also control for the effect of state duration and colonial past. The newer the state, the more it will be concerned with its sovereignty and therefore the less likely to ratify multilateral agreements. The dichotomous variable COLONIAL PAST determines whether a state has been colonized by a Western colonial power since 1700. The focus is exclusively on "Western overseas" colonialism (Teorell and Hadenius 2005) . As past experience with colonialism is linked to a state's struggle for independence, we expect former colonies to be reluctant to bind themselves through multilateral treaties.
Finally, we also test whether the overall effects remain unchanged when we control for issue areas. We include binary variables for three major issue areas covered in our sample:
HUMAN RIGHTS (including human rights, cultural and public health agreements), SECURITY (including security, crime and diplomatic relations), and ENVIRONMENT ("trade" is the reference category).
Results
Our results support the general argument that new EU democracies are strong supporters of post-Cold War multilateralism. Figure 1 shows that the ratification pace in the period 1990 to This finding holds across different policy fields (see Figure 2 ). New EU democracies ratify multilateral treaties more rapidly in all four issue areas. Differences in the ratification pace are most evident in the areas of crime & security, and human rights. In order to assess the effect of "new democracies" and "new EU democracies" under the ceteris paribus assumption, we use Cox proportional hazards regression models. The Cox proportional hazards model estimates hazard ratios for the variables discussed above. The hazard ratio 8 is the exponential of the regression coefficient (exp(coef)) in the model and measures the effect of the variable. A hazard ratio of 1 indicates that there is no effect on state commitment to international agreements. A ratio of more than 1 indicates an increase in the rate of ratification, and a ratio of less than 1 indicates a reduction in the rate of ratification. 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 The likelihood ratio test assumes independence of observations within a cluster (country), the Wald and robust score tests do not. ***p|z| = <0.001, **p|z| = <0.01, *p|z| = <0.05).
Models 1 and 2 show the effect for new democracies based on the categorical "new democracy" variable. Both models reveal that autocracies (model 1: 54%, model 2: 58%) and "other" states (71% in models 1 and 2) have significantly lower ratification likelihoods than do new democracies. Differences between new and established democracies, however, are not statistically significant. Model 2 reveals that an EU member state is 58% more likely to ratify post-Cold War treaties than is a state which is not a member of the EU. Models 3 and 4 are estimated in parallel to models 1 and 2, but are based on the dichotomous variable NEW DEMOCRACY. Holding other variables constant, we find that new democracies are more likely to commit to international agreements than other states (model 3: 36%, model 4: 34%). 9 Model 4 also shows that EU members are 92% more likely to ratify multilateral treaties. In models 5 and 6 we incorporate an interaction term for NEW DEMOCRACIES and EU in order to test the ratification likelihood of "new EU democracy" against "new non-EU democracy."
Model 5 is a reduced model and presents the estimated effect for the main variable (NEW DEMOCRACIES*EU). In model 6 we control for the other relevant factors and include the issue area variables: SECURITY, ENVIRONMENT and HUMAN RIGHTS. In both models our main variable is statistically significant. Following model 5, a new EU democracy is 59% more likely to ratify a multilateral post-Cold War treaty than is a new democracy outside the EU; and under the ceteris paribus assumption the effect is 54% (models 6). 10 The ratification likelihood also differs across major issue areas. We find the highest effect for SECURITY on treaty ratification (110%). For new EU democracies the likelihood of ratifying security treaties is 45% higher than for human rights treaties and 48% higher than for environmental treaties.
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As regards the other controls, we find no robust and statistically significant effect for MILITARY POWER, TRADE OPENNESS, COLONIAL PAST and STATE DURATION. Overall, the statistical results strongly confirm that newly established EU democracies are at the forefront of multilateralism. and Slovakia (5.4 million). Estonia is the smallest country in terms of territory and population size (1.3 million). Finally, as far as ethnic composition is concerned, Poland and the Czech Republic are relatively homogeneous nation states. In Romania and Slovakia ethnic minorities account for about 10% of the population (Hungarians are the largest minority in both countries). Estonia is a fairly heterogeneous country, with Russians being the greatest ethnic minority (around 25%) (European Union 2012).
We chose a subset of 17 particularly significant treaties from our full sample. An overview of the selected treaties, including the ratification dates for the five countries is presented in table A2. These treaties include some of the most significant international law instruments post-1990 (examples are the Kyoto Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). We expect parliaments not simply to rubberstamp governments' decisions, but to engage in a proper ratification debate. 13 The subset of the selected agreements also cuts across different issue areas; it includes six treaties on the environment; seven on trade 14 , three each on security and human rights; two in the area of criminal law and two on culture. Finally, the selection of treaties covers the entire period of analysis from the early 1990s to 2007. Four of the treaties were concluded before 1996, ten between 1996 and 2000, and three after 2000 (see table A2 ). Of the subset of 17 treaties, the Czech Republic did not ratify two treaties, and Estonia and Poland one treaty each. All 17 treaties have been adopted in Romania and Slovakia.
Statements during Parliamentary Ratification Debates
In order to test the exact signals sent by new EU democracies when ratifying multilateral agreements (1. RECOGNITION, 2. STRATEGIC AUTONOMY, 3. PLEASING EU), we analyzed the content of parliamentary debates. We engaged five coders with the linguistic skills to search and translate parliamentary debates over ratification of the selected treaties. The available data enabled us to study 58 parliamentary debates.
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The parliamentary debates strongly support our argument that treaty ratification serves specific strategic foreign policy objectives. While we found evidence for outward-oriented signaling toward the international community, the EU and Russia, we found no evidence that would indicate a government strategy to lock in domestic politics through intergovernmental networks. 16 Overall we recorded 62 statements from 42 debates.
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Most of the statements confirming our expectations were made in debates held in the Polish parliament (16 statements; 26% of all statements), followed by Estonia (14 statements; 23%) and Romania (13 statements; 21%). In the ratification debates of the Slovak National Council 10 such statements were made (amounting to 16% of all statements). For the Czech Republic, where fewer debates were available, we counted 9 statements (15%) (see tables 3 and A3).
More than half of all statements (52%) indicate willingness to follow the European lead in multilateralism.
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Statements in support of European norms and values were made most frequently in the Romanian debates (accounting for 28% of all statements referring to the PLEASING EU signal). The objective of achieving international acceptance and recognition by the international community was signaled in 18 statements (29% of all statements).
International recognition was the most prominent concern in the Polish parliamentary debates (33% of the statements related to the RECOGNITION signal).
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Twelve statements refer to the attempts to pursue strategic autonomy (amounting to 19% of all statements). Most such statements were made in the Estonian debates (6 in total coming to 50% of all STRATEGIC AUTONOMY statements).
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To account for the possibility that commitment to multilateral treaties might simply represent opportunistic behavior, we searched the parliamentary ratification debates for statements other than external signaling. We found eight statements in the debates in Estonia, Poland and Romania that did not fall under one of the three major signaling arguments but which refer to other signals such as eligibility for financial assistance (see table A3 ). As such references were sporadic, we can rule out the possibility that commitment to multilateral treaties is predominantly driven by opportunistic considerations. Conversely, we found no evidence that new European democracies joined multilateral treaties for truly sincere reasons (believing in the virtue of multilateralism as the right form of international cooperation). 4 ).
In conclusion, parliamentary ratification debates provide strong evidence of the relative importance of the three signals outlined in the theoretical section. The choice of two contentious treaties should also make potential lock-in strategies more visible, should they be present.
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In the case of European states, the evidence for these two treaties emphasizes the importance of the EU signal, although arguments related to recognition and autonomous policy-making were also found. For the Latin American countries, none of these external signals seems relevant for the decision to ratify. opposed by important segments of society. This made it difficult for the governing parties to proceed toward ratification. In addition, both countries took some political risks in pursuing ratification since the US did not ratify either of the two agreements.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 and established the International Criminal Court June 2002 (Galain Palermo 2006:403) . Yet, the implementation act has dragged on for many years. Similar to the Chilean case, it took a long time for the domestic courts (and constitutional amendments) to prepare the ground to hold former dictator Juan Maria
Bordaberry accountable for violations of human rights. In sum, in both Latin American countries it proved difficult for the governments to bring the internal lock-in signal into play; external signaling on the other had was absent.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
The The lengthy ratification process of the Cartagena Protocol can mainly be attributed to perceived costs of the agreement, which have been already a point of disapproval during negotiations. Moreover, due to the nature of the treaty there were no lock-in attempts.
Conclusions
European states have been at the forefront of multilateralism since the end of the Cold War.
However, the fact that new EU democracies have been especially interested in multilateral treaties has so far been overlooked in the literature. We have provided a theoretical explanation for new European democracies' strong propensity to ratify multilateral agreements.
New European democracies ratify multilateral treaties as a signal to help them achieve three major foreign policy objectives: to obtain international recognition, to please the EU and to foster their strategic autonomy for future foreign policy making. We see recognition analytically prior to reputation; the latter develops over time and is related to implementation of international treaties (Guzman 2008) . Reputation is "contingent on its past behaviour" and "the knowledge that today's conduct will affect tomorrow's reputation" (Guzman 2008:86) . Therefore, at first, this factor could be called recognition and later, in the 1990s, reputation. For simplicity we call it recognition.
3
The data for a subject is presented as multiple rows or "observations," each of which applies to an interval of observation (start, stop] . 4 For a detailed description of the data structure and statistical techniques see Milewicz (2010). 5 In this study, we are confronted with fixed right-censoring and left-truncation. This excludes states that are still in the process of accession (and who eventually will become members). The hazard ratio must be independent of time. This defines the proportional hazards property. Results from the test for constancy of the coefficients based on scaled Schoenfeld residuals indicate that the assumption of the proportional hazards is met by all covariates. 9 The hazard ratio for NEW DEMOCRACY is calculated by exp(coef NEW DEMOCRACY ) = 1.36 = 36%. 10 The hazard ratio for a new EU democracy compared with a new non-EU democracy is calculated by exp(coef EU + coef EU*NEW DEMOCRACY ).
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The hazard ratio is calculated by exp(coef SECURITY )/exp(coef HUMAN RIGHTS ).
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As the ratification likelihood for new democracies might differ between three time periods: i) the period between the end of communism and the beginning of accession negotiations; ii) the period of accession negotiations; and iii) the full-membership period -we have also tested the results based on a subsample of treaties open for ratification during the period of accession negotiations. The results did not change the general pattern. 13 This choice allows us to gather sufficient information on parliamentary debates upon treaty ratification. 14 As the WTO agreements have been debated and ratified as one agreement, we count the WTO agreements as one treaty.
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For the Czech Republic we recorded eight debates (two treaties were not debated and not ratified; seven debates were not available). Ten parliamentary debates were accessible for Poland (six debates were not available; one treaty has not been debated and ratified to date), eleven debates for Romania (six debates were not available) and thirteen debates for Estonia (three debates were not available; one treaty has not been debated and ratified). Debates on
